题目：Endowment Distribution Procedures, Serial Reciprocity and Social Preferences

演讲人：Jianlin Zhang Singapore Institute of Management

时间：2012年3月26日（周一） 19:00——20:00

地点：邵逸夫科学馆36365线路检测中心|主頁欢迎您501

Abstract: We experimentally investigate the effect of endowment allocation procedures on social preferences using a two-stage dictator game. In the first stage, participants who were randomly selected as allocators had to perform a task in order to earn money. Better performance on the task resulted in higher earnings. In our baseline meritocratic treatment, the allocators' initial endowment was set equal to their individual earnings. We compared this with an egalitarian treatment whereby the allocators' initial endowment was set equal to the average earnings of all allocators. Essentially, high performers were taxed and underperformers were subsidized by the high performers. In the second stage, the allocators had to divide their endowment with the recipients. We show that the allocators were more generous in the egalitarian treatment than in the meritocratic treatment. Interestingly, being taxed did not reduce the high performers' generosity but being subsidized did significantly increase the underperformers' generosity. Thus, being treated kindly induced the underperformers to reciprocate forward to other people.