时间：2015年5月13日 15：00

地点：邵逸夫科学馆513

主讲人：张牧扬博士 上海财经大学中国公共财政研究院

题目：Political Competition vs. Revenue Seeking: An Analysis on Urban Land Allocation in Chinese Cities

摘要：This paper extends the literature on political processes of land supply to a distinctive political background by exploring how China’s local political competition affects land allocation. In a theoretical model, local leaders face a trade-off between career promotion and fiscal revenue maximization. Political competition impels local leaders to improve economic performance records to influence central government in their favor, leading to an inclination to provide more industrial land at lower prices to attract investment, and to reduce the supply of residential and commercial land. Younger leaders enjoy greater improvement on the perception of their competence from high economic growth than older ones, making them more eager to allocate land for industrial uses. By utilizing a city-level dataset of 2003-2010,we find a negative and significant correlation between the local leader’s age and the proportion of land leased for industrial use. These results are robust to various alternative measures of the key variables, the inclusion of cohort and leader effects, and the exclusion of special cities.

Key Words:Local leader characteristics, Land supply, Housing price

JEL Codes:D73, H71, R3, R52