【摘 要】本文在对马克思“分工―分配”的劳资关系模型回顾的基础上，对新古典边际生产力分配理论、福利经济学及新制度经济学对个人收入分配问题的理解进行了深入的讨论。结论表明，政治经济学和新古典经济学对分配问题理解的核心区别在于对劳动力不同假设：在政治经济学中，分工是劳动力的分工，决定了分配也必须以劳动力为基本单位；而理性的分工个体无法分配到自己参与生产的剩余――或者说剩余价值的贡献者和分配者不对称则是造成收入差距的主要制度原因。
而本文的实证表明：（1）要素稀缺性逻辑无法解释中国的收入差距问题，27年来，劳动力和资本相对数量的变化并没有引起单位劳动力和单位资本相对价格的趋同。（2）个人收入（或者工资）在不同群体――省际之间、城乡之间、行业之间的分布不但与不同群体中劳均资本规模相关；而且（3）政府权力的介入，对省际个人收入的差异和行业个人收入的差异均存在显著的影响。本文结论表明：中国目前不同群体收入差距的主要原因在于：（1）资本要素收益率远远高于劳动力要素收益率，这种非正常差异背后蕴涵着中国各级政府对经济增长（GDP）及其相关引资偏好，以及由于这一偏好产生的分配制度中权威性（税收）偏向――具体表现为对劳工阶层收入增长的制度性抑制和对资本积累的制度性激励。（2）政府权力对资本要素在不同群体中配置过程中的介入。
【关键词】分工 分配 收入差距 劳资关系 政治经济学
【摘 要】近年来，房屋拆迁问题及我国现行房屋拆迁制度的调整缺失成为社会关注的焦点问题，屡屡发生于各地的恶性房屋拆迁事件更是将这项攸关民生与民权的核心问题推向社会转型的风口浪尖。在这些房屋拆迁纠纷事件中，政府、开发商、法院、建筑公司、社会公众都卷入其中，私人权利与公共利益、个人利益与政治权力以及商业利益交织在一起，矛盾也就纠缠错结，愈演愈烈，造成社会关系的高度紧张。本文旨在从法和经济学的角度探讨现行拆迁制度的利弊得失，并结合相关典型案例对政府、开发商、被拆迁人的各自利益关系进行梳理，进而对主要由物权法、土地管理法、城市规划法、城市房地产管理法，特别是城市房屋拆迁管理条例等基本法律框架调整下的城市房屋拆迁问题进行博弈论和模式化的分析，明确总结并指出当前城市房屋拆迁纠纷的法律困境及其根源，最后在总结经验和法律比较的基础上提出完善现行房屋拆迁制度的对策建议。
【关键词】城市房屋拆迁 法律与经济分析 对策与建议
【摘要】本文意图抓住中国经济增长中的财政分权、制度创新和地方政府在经济增长中的重要作用等关键特征，从财政分权这一角度出发论证政府制度创新的能力和动力，并进一步探索由此引致的经济增长。研究表明，财政分权过程中中央政府和地方政府根据制度创新的比较优势进行了事实上的“制度创新分工”，这种结构中的制度创新成为经济增长的重要动力。
【摘 要】中俄的农业改革都是从农村土地制度开始的。中国实行渐进式改革，在现有农村土地集体所有制的基础上，逐渐引入农民使用土地的产权变革，其初期成效明显，但后续前景堪忧。俄罗斯实行激进式改革，实行土地私有化，改组国营农场和集体农庄，迅速建立私人家庭农场，其初始的混乱导致农业生产的衰退，但一段时间以后，农业出现改观，发展势头强劲。中俄两国农业改革的进程及其绩效可能蕴含着激进式制度变迁具有增长的后发优势。
【摘要】理性选择是法经济学的核心范式，其约束中的主体要追求其利益和效用的最大化，而利益（效用）等于收益减去成本。具体到中央与地方分权问题，就必然要在制度设计和安排中追求收益最大化和成本最小化，以实现中央与地方分权利益的最大化。调整分权关系的法律制度应当既要促使分权交易费用最小化，同时还要最小化公共物品的生产成本，从而提高分权的效率，实现分权的优化。必须考虑制度本身的交易费用以及守法和违法的成本收益。目前我国中央与地方分权制度存在谈判费用、执行费用和监督费用均过高的问题。应当消除地方政府的寻租空间，压缩中央和地方两级政府的机构并裁减其冗员，同时提高中央政府和地方人大对地方政府监督的效率。
【摘要】哈耶克的自发秩序观可归结为“一个中心，两个基本点”，其中心论题是扩展秩序，而市场和法制则是秩序扩展的基本保障，其基本含义就是在一般性规则之下通过社会主体之间的自由竞争以推进社会秩序的扩展。然而，任何抽象规则的形成和贯彻都存在着人类有意识的能动作用，人类社会秩序的扩展也同时包含了自发和自觉两方面的动力，每一方面的合理而谨慎运用都可能促进社会的进步，而它们的共同基础是伦理的认同。而且，本文通过对哈耶克思想作一整体性检视后发现，哈耶克并不是自发秩序的绝对信奉者，其自发秩序与其说是达尔文主义的，不如说是拉马克主义的；不过，由于哈耶克本人的意识形态取向以及对当时日益偏盛的理性实践的过激反应，导致了他集中主要精力去发掘西方社会中的自由演化传统。
中图分类号：F012 文献标示码：A
【摘 要】市场的本质是交易，但在信息不完备时，很多有利可图的交易无法达成。本文通过对转型经济中合约执行机制有关理论与实证文献进行梳理，发现，正式合约执行机制能解决或减轻交易的信息不完备。当正式合约执行机制不存在或不适用时，非正式合约执行机制能补充或替代正式合约执行机制，从而提高市场效率；但非正式合约执行机制有时会产生排他性和价格合谋。因而在转型经济中，采取积极而切实的措施发展司法体系就至关重要。
8、题目：基于人性结构和制度功能有效性的制度变迁理论
【摘 要】对制度变迁的经济学研究大体上可分为基于供求分析框架的制度变迁理论和寻找心理认知基础的制度变迁理论。本文在前人研究的基础之上，提出制度功能的有效性概念,并采用人性结构分析方法研究制度变迁，并尝试重构制度变迁理论。
9、题目：独裁和多数票规则的经济学：看不见的手与权力的运用
【摘 要】本文将阐明，不论何时，拥有不受挑战武力的理性自利者在武力能够发挥作用的范围内，都具有共容的稳定利益，他们将按照与社会和其他目标利益一致的方式行事，并且达到了令人吃惊的程度。好像是统治力量受到一只隐藏之手的指引，对我们而言，这跟亚当・斯密时期市场上那只看不见的手一样一点也不荒谬。事实上，当拥有武力的最优实体有足够大的共容利益――我们定义为超级共容利益――时，看不见的手将会非常突出地引导它像对待他们自己一样对待武力的其他目标。
1．Title: Division of Labour, Distribution and labour-capital bargaining
Author(s):Yong Yue Huiqin Yao
Abstract：Summarizing the distribution theory from Marx’s labor-capital bargaining model, distribution theory of Marginal productivity, Second theorem of welfare economics and New Institutional Economics, the thesis will try to explain China earnings inequality in different crowds by Marx’s labour-capital bargaining model.
Based on empirical research, the contributions are as follow: (1) The relative scarcity of factor failing to explain the income inequality of China completely, (2) income level between different groups being correlated with capital scale per labor, and (3) with government’s investment scale (its investment proportion in the whole investment, correlating with earnings level of different provinces and different industries) as well.
To draw the conclusion, the main reason why the income inequality of China is: the governments at all levels are eager for enhancing GDP and related tax, leading to concentrating on prompting capital accumulation and controlling labor price. Therefore, the income inequality of China is a issue of political economy and the change relies on the institution reform and promotion of market economy, which is homology with the new classic economics.
Key Words:Division of Labour；Distribution； Income inequality； Labour-capital bargaining ；Political economics.
JEL Classifications： B140 D310 E640
2. Title: The Interplay of Power, Rights and Interests
Abstract:In recent years, the problem that China’schaiqian(“Demolition and Relocation”) has emerged as a field prone to disputes. Such disputes frequently involve various governmental bodies, private developers, the courts, construction companies, and the general public. Conflicts between the private rights and the public interest, between the individual interests, commercial interests and the political power, are becoming increasingly fierce and have raised concerns about social stability. Those well-connected construction developers try to gain the huge illegal profits. Some forced eviction cases violate basic human rights, but the legal redress for evicted persons still lack. With an examination of the current law framework in China and what policy changes have been to attempt to deal with the issues associated with Demolishment and Relocation, the author use the method of law and economics and two game theory models to directly illustrate situation encountered in practice and theProperty law，Law of the People's Republic of China on Administration of the Urban Real Estate，City Planning Law of the Peoples Republic of China，especiallyRegulation on the Administration of Urban House Demolishment and Relocation(by State Department, 2001) and other national laws and regulations. Finally, the author describing the present difficulties in legal relief forChaiqiandisputes, and presents some possiblesolutions and recommendations.
Key word:Urban House Demolition and Relocation (chaiqian), Economic and Legal Analysis, Solutions and Recommendations
3. Title: Fiscal Decentralization, Institutional Innovation and Economic Growth
Author(s):Ruiming Liu Yongxiu Bai
Abstract:Fisical decentralization and instituional innovation are two key figures in china’s economic growth. This paper investigates the economic growth from the perspective of fisical decentralization, we think that the fiscal decentralization induced to government pushed institutional innovation. Institutional innovation division of labour between central government and local government according to their comparative advantages is the engine of the economic growth in the past decades.
Key Words:Fisical decentralization; Instituional innovation; Economic growth
JEL Classification：F620 P200 O100
4.Title: On Advantages for Growth of Radical Institutional Transformation
ABSTRACT：Both agricultural reforms of China and Russia started on the rural land systems. China took the gradual transformation path, which introduced the land property rights for the peasants on the incumbent collective ownership. The initial effects were obvious; however, the later perspective was to be obscure. In contrast, Russia took the radical transformation path, which privatized the agrarian land to the tillers, reshaping the state farms and collective farms into family run farms. The stirs led the Russian agriculture to fall sharply, and after a period of time, the situation turned up and the trend was from good to even better. Both reforms and their different performances show that there are advantages for growth of radical institutional transformation.
KEY WORDS：radical reforms agrarian land privatization
growth advantages of radical institutional transformation
JEL Classifications：O170 O570
5. Title: On Cost-Benefit and Transaction Cost of Decentralization between the Central Government and Local Governments
Abstract：Rational choice is the hardcore paradigm of Law and Economics. It means that the benefit (utility) equals to the remaining sum that income subtracted from cost. In decentralization issue, the institutional design and arrangement should pursue both the maximization and minimization inevitably, in order to realize the maximization of benefit in decentralization. The legal institution regulating decentralization should urge the minimization of transaction cost in decentralization and cost of public goods simultaneity, in order to promote the efficiency and optimization of decentralization. Two factors must be considered: the transaction cost of institution in decentralization and the cost and income of observation or transgressing the law. At present, the cost of negotiation, execution and supervision in decentralization institution are exorbitant. As a solution, the rent-seeking opportunities of local governments should be eliminated, and the supervision of National and local People's Congress should be enhanced, the organizations and supers in central government and local governments should be reduced, the supervising efficiency of central government and local People's Congresses to the local governments should be promoted.
Keywords：decentralization； cost-benefit analysis； transaction cost； law and economics
JEL Classifications：K190 G000 H100
6．Title: On the Human’s Consciousness Driving Social Order to Extend Continuously
Abstract:Hayek’s view of endogenous order, which means free competition under a general abstract rule will lead social order to extend continuously, can be reduced to “one center and two fundaments”, thereinto, the centre task is extensive order and the market and law is its guarantee. However, the forming and carrying through of any abstract rule must include the action of human’s consciousness, and there are two kind forces to promote social order to extend: spontaneous force and self-conscious force, whose common foundation is ethics. What’s more, by a full Examination of Hayek’s thought, this paper found that Hayek was not steadfast believer in endogenous order and he is Lamarckist rather than Darwinist. Nevertheless, because of his ideology and ultra- reaction to rationalistic practice, Hayek focus to excavate the tradition of latitudinarianism and evolutionism rooted in western society.
Keywords:Endogenous order, Extensive order, Ethics, Hayek
JEL Classifications：A130 K000 Z130
7. Title: Incomplete Information and Contract Enforcement
Abstract:The nature of the market is trade. When information is incomplete, many profitable deals can not be made. For market to function there must be some mechanisms of contract enforcement to transmit information. This review finds that a well-functioning legal system can be used to mitigate information asymmetries. When legal mechanism of contract enforcement is absent or inadequate, informal mechanisms of contract enforcement can substitute for or complement to courts in allowing deal to be made. While informal mechanisms of contract enforcement fosters economic efficiency by making gains from trade realizable, it sometimes also harms efficiency by excluding new entrants from trading or by achieving price collusion. So it is important to take measures to develop a well-functioning legal system.
Key Words:Incomplete information; Market mechanism; Mechanisms of contract enforcement
8. Title: Theory of Institutional Change Based on Human Nature Framework and Validity of Institutions
Abstracts:We can classify the theories of institutional changes into the two kinds: the theories of institutional changes base on the framework of demand and supply and search the foundations of psychology and cognition. On the basis of the previous research works, I bring forward the conception about the validity of institutions, and use the method of the human nature framework to analyze the changes of the institutions, and try to reconstruct the theory of institutional changes.
Key words: institutional change validity of institution human nature framework
JEL: Classifications: B520
9．Title : The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force
Author(s) :Martin C. McGuire Mancur Olson, Jr.
Abstract:The Essay will demonstrate that they do―that whenever a rational self-interested actor with enquestioned coercive power has an encompassing and stable interest in the domain over which the power is exercised, that actor is led to act in ways that are, to s surprising degree, consistent with the interests of society and of those subject to that power. It is as if the ruling power were guided by a hidden hand no less paradoxical for us than the invisible hand in the market was for people in Adam Smith’s time. In fact, when an optimizing entity with coercive power has a sufficiently encompassing interest―what we define as a super-encompassing interest―the invisible hand will lead it remarkably, to treat those subject to its power as well as it treats itself.
Key Words:Autocracy Majority Rule Encompassing Interest Power
JEL Classifications: H010 P160 P480
