1、题目：社会资本，法律对中小投资者的保护和IPO抑价
【摘 要】本文分析了法律对中小投资者保护（立法程度和执法效率）和社会资本对我国IPO抑价程度的影响。结果发现，尽管立法程度和IPO抑价间存在负相关性，但控制了其他变量后，并未对抑价产生显著的影响；而相比之下，执法效率却显著地对IPO抑价产生了负影响；同时，社会资本也稳健地凸显出对抑价程度的减缓作用。因此，要形成合理的IPO抑价程度，不仅需要完善法律制度，而且更要注重执法效率，同时也要发挥社会资本等非正规治理因素的作用。
【关键词】 IPO抑价 社会资本 法律对中小投资者的保护
【摘 要】经理人的报酬不仅具有激励经理人努力工作的作用，而且还应该能够促进经理人市场的均衡。即能够实现能力高的管理者可以获得较高的报酬，否则，企业就不能吸引有能力的管理者留在本企业工作。基于上面这样一个想法，我们构造了一个简单的模型来考察均衡后管理者的报酬状况。我们的结论是在一个相当简化的条件下得到，即国有企业可以花费较少的报酬就可以获得能力高的管理者，但不能说国有企业就一定会选择能力高的管理者，也就是说：不能说国有企业的管理者能力要比民营企业高。如果企业关于市场中高管能力评价的信息是正确的，那么企业高管的报酬应该是“企业绩效对高管能力的敏感程度”和“企业能够提供的除报酬以外的利益”的函数，并且侧重分析了额外利益的影响；如果企业关于市场中高管能力评价的信息不一定是正确的，那么企业高管的报酬应该由“管理者的特征”、“企业绩效对高管能力的敏感程度”、“企业能够提供的除报酬以外的利益”共同决定的。
【摘 要】创业过程逐渐成为创业研究的热点，不同学科从其特有的研究视角，运用本领域的理论和相关方法对创业过程进行观察和研究。但是现有的研究成果仍旧是在成熟市场经济的框架下进行的，本文尝试运用比较制度分析方法，在制度分层演进的前提下，分析不同的制度安排对创业企业家个体的关联，揭示其中的深层逻辑。通过创业企业家在面对外部冲击时表现出来的反应策略，试图描述企业家的战略性作用。论文建构了关于制度演进与企业家创业的一般性分析框架，勾勒出转型背景下的企业家创业理论。
【关键词】比较制度；制度演进；创业过程；战略性作用
中图分类号：F064.2，F270 文献标识码：A
4、题目：契约理论与能力理论融合视角的企业本质问题研究
【摘 要】基于契约理论与企业能力理论相结合的视角，审视了企业本质的相关问题。研究认为，企业的本质在于“契约性”与“生产性”的统一，作为市场与社会中间组织的企业，一方面通过由其契约特性所支撑的社会机能――内部组织化和经济成果的再分配与社会建立了非经济性的联系，另一方面通过由其生产特性所维系的经济机能――商品的生产和交换与市场建立了经济关系，所以企业既是一个经济组织，同时也是一个社会组织。由此决定了企业的活动应该体现经济合理性和社会合理性的综合要求，企业最终追求的应是在不损害市场与社会的正常机能的前提下，其经济与社会价值的最大化，而持续竞争优势获得与维系是实现这一目标的关键。
5、题目：从不可单方退出的隐含合约看我国农信社改革
【摘 要】中国的发展型威权政府与孱弱农户之间始终存在一个能够自实施的隐含合约，那就是政府扶持农户以换取农户的政治支持，而且中央政府无法单方面退出这个隐含合约，它只有很好地实施该合约，才能承担起推动国家富强的历史使命。威权政府的机会主义、责任推诿和外部干预内部化等一系列发生在农信社制度变迁中的策略行为都内生于该合约的自实施过程中。所以，要改变农信社跌入劣均衡的局面，需要中央政府出面并联手农户，来增强博弈各方的信息沟通和利益协调，约束地方政府和农信社内部人的行为，从而形成好的制度均衡。
【关键词】农村信用社；隐含合约；利益联盟；威权主义
【摘要】本文从微观个体的语言学习角度出发对语言发展、消亡动态过程进行规范经济分析。通过综合考虑语言学习过程中的网络效应、语言学习的情感需求因素和社会交往行为，本文得到了语言动态演化的两大结果：基础均衡和投机均衡，并说明了语言自然垄断地位以及双语社会形成的条件。本文所提供的结论能够为国家方言政策以及外语政策等提供决策支持。
【摘 要】违约金是违约救济方式之一。违约金能促进合同当事人的效率投资，使当事人产生最佳防御和最佳信赖的激励，有力规避逆向选择，有利于实现合同总剩余最大化。惩罚性违约金是当事人进行成本收益分析的理性计算，体现了当事人对合同的估价和对风险的分担。合同法应该为当事人提供效率性激励，应对当事人的违约金约定予以尊重。对惩罚性违约金以承认为主，以区别情况予以规制为辅。
【摘要】对婚姻进行法经济学分析是必要的，也是可行的。从法经济学角度看，婚姻关系不但是一种契约，而且是一种关系契约。结婚和离婚的经济缘由取决于当事人成本与效益的比较。影响婚姻效力的因素主要有结婚登记的履行、婚姻当事人缺乏缔约行为能力和资格、当事人意思表示不真实、重婚和近亲结婚以及患有医学上认为不应当结婚的疾病且婚后尚未治愈。
【摘 要】庇古认为政府行政干预方式是解决外部性问题的唯一途径，科斯提出问题俱有交互性，在交易成本为正的世界中，市场交易、替代型经济组织、政府行政干预和权利的法律界定四种方式都能解决外部性问题，但各有利弊。民商法在落实市场交易、替代性经济组织和权利的法律界定三种途径上，发挥着不容忽视的作用。在这一问题上，法学界普遍存在着重经济法方法，轻视民商法方法的倾向，这在理论上是错误的，在实践中是有害的。我国应重视民商法方法在解决市场失灵问题上的重要作用。
10、题目：交易成本、合约弹性与明清徽州的定额地租
【摘 要】本文主要从交易成本视角分析农业中的租佃合约安排，并基于此对明清徽州地区定额地租居于主导地位的历史进行解释。大量的史料表明，农业租佃关系中存在大量威廉姆森意义上的交易成本。不同的租佃合约安排具有降低交易成本的作用，然而，没有一种租佃合约具有绝对的优势。我们区分了合约安排和合约条件，从而区分了两种降低交易成本的合约调整途径：在既定的合约安排下，改变合约条件；或者，在保持合约条件不变时，改变合约安排。由此，本文把明清徽州地区定额地租居于主导解释为丰富的合约条件可以保证定额地租的有效性。
【关键词】交易成本 租佃合约 定额地租 徽州 合约条件
【摘 要】2004年，巴塞尔银行监管委员会公布了《统一资本计量和资本标准的国际协议：修订框架》（巴塞尔新资本协议），其中的重大创新是允许银行采用内部评级法，即允许银行使用自身内部系统的风险评估来衡量信用风险进而作为资本计算的输入参数。本文概述了巴塞尔新资本协议出台的背景，重点阐述了银行使用内部评级法的一些具体要求，包括风险暴露类别的划分、初级法和高级法的区别，以及银行实施内部评级法时需要满足的最低要求，包括评级体系的设计、评级体系的运作、公司治理和监督、风险量化等。最后，说明了基于内部评级法的资本计算方法以及其所具有的风险敏感性。
【摘 要】公共选择，是指人们决定提供什么样的公共物品、怎样提供和分配公共物品以及设立相应匹配规则的行为与过程。公共选择理论则期望研究并把研究结果影响人们的公共选择过程从而实现其社会效用的最大化。与此相适应，公共选择不应当仅仅与民主相关，而是涵盖了立法、司法、行政等内容，通过个人化公共选择与民主化公共选择的交互作用实现自我完善的一个系统。正是通过这种系统，个人化和民主化的缺陷都能够得到防范与制约，从而使公共选择可能会实现公共选择理论希冀的那种可能性。
【关键词】：公共选择 公共选择理论 法官规则 个人化公共选择 民主化公共选择
【摘 要】关于制度或者诸如人力资本和健康等生产要素对经济增长的贡献哪个更为重要的争论是不恰当的。收入对制度变量的回归分析不能理解制度如何影响生产要素的现状及其之间特定联系，也不能理解谁获得由此产生的相关利益。借助产权、安全、自由贸易或者控制成本等一些通用指标，不能有效地对制度加以计量；由于对绩效产生影响的正式和非正式制度是独特的，因此，可以借助对人类相互依赖性的资源分类来改进对制度变量的经验性确认。人类相互依赖性资源分类包括高排他成本、报酬递增、非竞争性成本函数等。增长和缓解贫困可能要求选择性没收产权。所谓的效率和分配之间的交易是很少被考虑到的。
1. Title: Social Capital, Law Protection of Minority Investors and IPO Underpricing
Author(s): Shaojun Xu Xuejun Jin
Abstract:This paper drew two variables as law’s enforcement and social capital into the analysis of the relationship between law protection of minority investors and IPO underpricing. And the results showed that there was a negative relationship between law and IPO underpricing, while after controlling other variables, there was no significant influence, while law’s enforcement and social capital had showed robust results as their negative influence on IPO underpricing. So this paper suggests that we should not only realize the importance of law, but also its enforcement and other informal governance mechanisms such as social capital, which may be more important in China.
Key words: IPO Underpricing Social Capital Law Protection of Minority Investors
JEL Classifications:G320 K220 Z100
2.Title: Senior Employeesc Salary, Enterprise performance, and Equilibrium of Manager's Market
Author(s):Wenge Liu Fangzhao Zhou
Abstract:Manager's reward has not only the effect stimulating a manager to work hard , fairly but also promote manager marketplace balance. That is , the manager with high capability should be payed highly. On the base, we design a simple model. But our conclusion is got under being condition simplifying considerably, is that state-owned enterprise can cost less reward being able to gain the director of high ability right. In other words, we can not say that the capability of the manager in state-owned enterprises is higher than the capability in private enterprises. We analysize the others payoff effect on the managers after researching the performance of enterprise. If the messages that the enterprises asset the ability of managers are right, then the rewards of the managers should be a function of the degree of performence sensitivity and the others benefit of enterprise.
Keywords:manager's reward；manager's ability；enterprise performance
JEL Classifications: M10 M12 M52
3.Title: The Entrepreneurial process in Perspective of Comparative Institutional Dynamics
Abstract：Entrepreneurial process has been the focus for new venture research. Different schools research entrepreneurial process in different perspectives. However many findings have backgrounds of mature market economy. In this paper, on the basis of comparative institutional methods and hypothesis of institutional dynamics, we analysis the impact of different institutional arrangement on entrepreneurs. We also try to describe the strategic role of entrepreneurs on the basis of their reacticity to outsider influences. Finally, the paper set up normative framework about institutional dynamics and venture creations to draw the outline of entrepreneurial theory in transition economy.
Key Words：Comparative institution； institutional dynamics；entrepreneurial process；strategic role
JELClassifications：D02，O17，M21
4．Title:An Integration of Contract Theory and Capabilities Theory：A Quest for the Nature of the Firm
Abstract: This article examines the relevant problems of the nature of the firm based on the integration of contract theory and capability theory. And the research believes that the nature of the firm lies in the unity of productivity and contractility, and the firm, as the intermediate organization between market and society, through the social function supported by contractility ---internal organization and reallocation of economic fruits, from one side, builds the non-economic relation with society, from another, through the economic function supported by productivity―the production and exchange of commodities, builds economic relation with market, so it is not only an economic organization, but a social organization. Thus, to decide social activities should embody the synthesized requirements of economic reasonability and social reasonability, the firm’s eventual pursuit without damaging normal functions of market and society should be the maximization of economic and social value while the key to this aim is to acquire and maintain continuous competitive advantage.
Key words: The Nature of the Firm；Contract Theory； Competitive Advantage
JEL Classifications: H110 B520 D820
5. Title:A study on Reform of Chinese Rural Credit Union System from Non-Unilateral-Exit Implicit Contract
Abstract：This paper provides a new explanation from a perspective of new politics of finance in order to solve the puzzle occurring at Chinese rural credit union system (RCU). We suppose that an implicit contract could be laid all the time between developmental authoritative government and frail farmer, which can be described farmer’s help from government for farmer’s political support. Central government cannot exitunilaterally this self-enforcing contract. Moreover, only enforcing this contract perfectly can central government better fulfill the historical task which makes china richer. The character of this contract incurs many problems such as authoritative government’s opportunism、shirking and internalizing external intervention. Therefore, this paper suggests that in order to transfer bad equilibrium to good ones, central government must be in company with farmers in boosting up information communication and interests harmonization among every game player to restrict behaviors of local governments and RCU’s insiders.
Keywords：Rural Credit Union System、Implicit Contract、Interest Coalition、Authoritarianism
JEL Classifications：D230 G210
6. Title: Economic Analyses of Linguistic Dynamics
Abstract:we studied the development and death of languages from the perspective of individuals’ language learning decisions. Incorporated the network effects and emotion attachments of language learning into the social interaction model, we derived two evolution equilibriums: speculative and fundamental equilibrium. We also concluded the conditions to form a language monopoly and bilingualism society. In the end, we implicated our conclusion to the national language policies.
Keywords:network effects, emotion attachments, social interaction
JEL Classifications:C620 D830 Z130
7．Title: Law and Economics of Liquidated Damage
Abstract：Theliquidated damage is one of breach remedies. It not only induces parties of contract to invest efficiently but also to provide the optimal incentive of precaution and reliance. The liquidated damage avoids the adverse selection. In sum, theliquidated damage helps parties of contract to achieve the maximization of surplus. The punitive damages of breach reflect the evaluation of contract and share of risk. The contract law should respect parties and enforce their agreement. So I protest to admit punitive damages for breach but regulate it according difference of circumstances.
Key words：Liquidated Damages； Punitive Damages； Law and Economics
8.Title: The Law and Economics of Marriage
Abstract:The law and economic analysis to the marriage is necessary but also feasible. From the point of view of law and economics, marriage is not only a contract, but is a Relations Contract. The economic reasons of Marriage and divorce depend on the parties to the comparison to costs and benefits. Factors affecting the effectiveness of marriage are mainly the fulfillment of marriage registration, the lack of contracting capacity and qualification of marriage parties, unauthentic means, bigamy and marriage with close relatives,and the marriage diseases which has been prohabited medically and has not been cured after marriage.
Key words:Marriage ,Divorce,Costs and Benefits
JEL Classifications:D130 K120
9. Title: Choice of Legal Institutions to Resolve Externality Problem
Abstract:In Pigou’s opinion, the administrative intervene is the only one way to resolve externality problem. But in Coase’s opinion, in a real world with transaction costs, there are four methods to resolve externality problem, which are transaction, economic organization, administrative intervene and legal allocation, every one of which has different strong points and weak points. To use transaction, economic organization and legal allocation to resolve externality, the function of the commercial law should not be neglected. However the nowadays Chinese jurisprudence research has paid attention to only administrative intervene and corresponding law branch, Economic Law, but has paid little attention on the function Commercial Law. This kind of academic tendency would be harmful to our legal reform. We should attach enough importance to the positive function of Commercial Law on resolving the failure of free market.
Key Words:Externality, Transaction Costs, Commercial Law and Economic Law
JEL Classification:B150 K100 K200
10. Title:Transaction Costs, Contract Flexibility and Huizhou’s Fixed-Rent during Ming and Qing Dynasties
Author(s):Yanyan Gao Decai Yang
Abstract:This paper analyzes agricultural tenancy contracts from the perspective of transaction costs theory, based on which the overwhelming position of fixed rent in Huizhou during Ming and Qing dynasties is explained. Fruitful evidences show that there are plenty Williamsonian transaction costs. Different tenancy contract arrangements can reduce transaction costs, while no contract shows absolute advantage on reducing transaction costs. Contract arrangements and conditions are distinguished to give two kinds of contract adjustments to reduce transaction costs: change contract arrangements given contract conditions, or change contract conditions given contract arrangements. Thus, the explanation of Huizhou’s fixed rent contract, according to our analysis, is the flexibility of contract conditions which keep the efficiency of fixed rent.
Key Words:Transaction costs, tenancy contracts, fixed rent, Huizhou, contract conditions
JEL Classifications: N550 R520
11.Title: Research on the IRBApproach inBaselⅡ
Abstract: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision releasedInternational Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework(Basel Ⅱ) in 2004, of which a significant innovation is the use of assessments of risk provided by banks’ internal systems to measure credit risk and as inputs to capital calculations. The paper reviews the background of Basel Ⅱ, analyzes the mechanics of the IRB approach, including categorization of exposures, differences between foundation and advanced approaches, etc., and minimum requirements for IRB approach, including rating system design, rating system operations, corporate governance and oversight, risk quantification, etc. Then, it shows method of capital calculations based on IRB approach and risk-sensitiveness of it.
Key Words: Basel Ⅱ, Internal ratings-based approach (IRB Approach), Capital requirements
JEL Classifications: G210，G280，G320
12. Title: Public Choice: Understanding，Modification and Rethinking
AbstractPublic choices, means the actions and processes of providing and distributing public goods and public services, of course, what kind of public goods and public services should be provided and how to set up relevant rules, also included. Accordingly, the theory of public choice, just pay more attention on how we can achieve the best public choice.Thus, Public choices are not be correlated to democracy, in fact, lawmaking, judicature, and administration, all should be contained. Through interplaying of private public choices and democratic public choices, the system of Public choices can be self- consummated, implement what the theory of public choice insisting and stressing.
Keyword：Public choices,the theory of public choice, judiciary rules, private public choices ,democratic public choices
JEL Classifications: B290 H000
13. Title: An Institutional Economics Perspective on Economic Growth
Author(s):A. Allan Schmid
Abstract：The debate over whether institutions or some factor such as human capital or health is more important for economic growth is misplaced. Regressing income on institutional variables will not provide an understanding of how institutions affect the presence and particular combination of the factors of production and who captures the benefits thereof. Institutions cannot be effectively measured by some general index of property rights, security, free trade, or regulatory burden. The empirical specification of institutional variables could be improved by categorizing the sources of human interdependence since the formal and informal institutions that affect performance are unique to each source. These categories include goods with high exclusion costs, increasing returns, and non-rival cost functions. Growth and poverty reduction may require selective confiscation of property rights. The alleged tradeoff between efficiency and distribution is poorly conceived.
Key words: institutional economics, economic growth, performance
