时间：2024年10月15日（周二） 上午9点

地点：邵逸夫科学馆500教室

讲座题目：Equilibrium Transitions in Sampling Dynamics: An Experimental Investigation

讲座内容：We experimentally investigate equilibrium transitions of a coordination game with three Pareto-ranked equilibria by varying the information agents receive about the opponents' play. Starting with the least efficient equilibrium, subjects played the game repeatedly for 80 periods quasi-continuously, under either full information or inexact information with two sizes of subsample random draws with replacement of the opponents' choices. We identify two channels for equilibrium transitions by combining experiments and structural estimations and simulations. Strategic teaching is the main driving factor, and sBRD does facilitate efficiency-improving equilibrium transitions. The effect of sampling is weakened by subjects' lagged responses with putting larger weights on earlier signals especially in smaller sampling sizes.

专家简介：李智，厦门大学经济学院财政系和王亚南36365线路检测中心|主頁欢迎您副教授，博士生导师，财政系副主任，美国华盛顿大学（西雅图）经济学博士。以博弈论和经济实验为主要工具，对各类公共政策进行制度设计和事前量化评估。论文发表于Journal of Public Economics，Journal of Environmental Economics and Management等期刊。目前担任国际期刊Resource and Energy Economics副主编（Associate Editor），中国环境科学学会碳排放交易专业委员会委员。